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All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year AND OR AND NOT All fields Title Creator / Publisher Keyword Year Sort by creator [A → Z]' creator [Z → A]' publishing year ↑ (asc)' publishing year ↓ (desc)' title [A → Z]' title [Z → A]' Simple Search Hits 1 – 4 of 4 1 Complex Signals: Reflexivity, Hierarchical Structure, and Modular Composition LaCroix, Travis. - : eScholarship, University of California, 2020 BASE Show details 2 Using Logic to Evolve More Logic: Composing Logical Operators via Self-Assembly LaCroix, Travis. - : Oxford University Press, 2019 BASE Show details 3 Using Logic to Evolve More Logic: Composing Logical Operators via Self-Assembly LaCroix, Travis. - 2019 BASE Show details 4 On Salience and Signalling in Sender-Receiver Games: Partial Pooling, Learning, and Focal Points LaCroix, Travis. - : Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.), 2019 Abstract: I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In David Lewis' (1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Brian Skyrms (2010) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I will refer to as a salience game—introduces a variable parameter into the atomic signaling game which allows for degrees of salience, thus filling in the continuum between Skyrms' and Lewis' models. The model does not presuppose any salience at the outset, but illustrates a process by which accidentally evolved salience is amplified, to the benefit of the players. It is shown that increasing degrees of salience allow populations to avoid sub-optimal pooling equilibria and to coordinate upon conventions more quickly. Keyword: Computer Simulation; Game Theory; Models and Idealization URL: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16270/ https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-018-1766-z http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16270/1/tlacroix-2018-Salience-and-Signaling-Synthese.pdf BASE Hide details

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