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The object : substance :: event : process analogy
Wellwood, Alexis; Hespos, Susan J. (R20509); Rips, Lance J.. - : U.K., Oxford University Press, 2018
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
In: Prof. Khoo via Mark Szarko (2016)
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Syntax and intentionality: An automatic link between language and theory-of-mind
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 133 (2014) 1, 249-261
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The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents
Jenkins, Adrianna C.; Dodell-Feder, David; Saxe, Rebecca; Knobe, Joshua. - : Public Library of Science, 2014
Abstract: In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets' mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.
Keyword: Research Article
URL: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25140705
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105341
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4139375
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The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents
In: Public Library of Science (2014)
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6
Thinking like a scientist: innateness as a case study
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 126 (2013) 1, 72-86
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7
Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 127 (2013) 2, 242-257
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8
Not all mutualism is fair, and not all fairness is mutualistic
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 36 (2013) 1, 100-101
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9
Folk Moral Relativism
In: Mind & language. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell 26 (2011) 4, 482-505
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10
Action Trees and Moral Judgment
In: Topics in cognitive science. - Hoboken, NJ [u.a.] : Wiley 2 (2010) 3, 555-578
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11
Fixing the default position in Knobe's competence model
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 352-353
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12
“Stupid people deserve what they get”: The effects of personality assessment on judgments of intentional action
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 332-334
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13
Scientists and the folk have the same concepts
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 344
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14
Are mental states assessed relative to what most people “should” or “would” think? Prescriptive and descriptive components of expected attitudes
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 341-343
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15
Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of others' psychological states, not theory-of-mind judgments
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 334-335
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16
Are we really moralizing creatures through and through?
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 351-352
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17
Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causation
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 349-350
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18
Qualitative judgments, quantitative judgments, and norm-sensitivity
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 335-336
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19
Person as moral scientist
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 340
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20
Putting normativity in its proper place
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 344-345
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