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Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
In: Prof. Khoo via Mark Szarko (2016)
Abstract: When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115427
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2
Syntax and intentionality: An automatic link between language and theory-of-mind
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 133 (2014) 1, 249-261
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3
The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents
Jenkins, Adrianna C.; Dodell-Feder, David; Saxe, Rebecca. - : Public Library of Science, 2014
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The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents
In: Public Library of Science (2014)
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5
Thinking like a scientist: innateness as a case study
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 126 (2013) 1, 72-86
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6
Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation
In: Cognition. - Amsterdam [u.a] : Elsevier 127 (2013) 2, 242-257
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7
Not all mutualism is fair, and not all fairness is mutualistic
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 36 (2013) 1, 100-101
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8
Action Trees and Moral Judgment
In: Topics in cognitive science. - Hoboken, NJ [u.a.] : Wiley 2 (2010) 3, 555-578
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9
Fixing the default position in Knobe's competence model
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 352-353
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10
“Stupid people deserve what they get”: The effects of personality assessment on judgments of intentional action
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 332-334
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11
Scientists and the folk have the same concepts
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 344
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12
Are mental states assessed relative to what most people “should” or “would” think? Prescriptive and descriptive components of expected attitudes
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 341-343
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13
Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of others' psychological states, not theory-of-mind judgments
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 334-335
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14
Are we really moralizing creatures through and through?
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 351-352
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15
Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causation
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 349-350
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16
Qualitative judgments, quantitative judgments, and norm-sensitivity
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 335-336
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17
Person as moral scientist
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 340
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18
Putting normativity in its proper place
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 344-345
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19
Person as moralist and scientist
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 331
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20
The person as moralist account and its alternatives
In: Behavioral and brain sciences. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press 33 (2010) 4, 353-365
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